Contact us

Civil defence requires a grand vision

In Estonia, following Russia’s comprehensive invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the increased perception of risk has prompted efforts to address the strategic deficit in civil defence. The measures undertaken are significant in their context, although they raise the question — what perspective is being employed for civil defence?
In circumstances of significant acute risk, any form of civil defense solution is preferable than inaction. For instance, in the absence of shelters, establishing a hiding place on-site is an expedient resolution; similarly, if sirens are entirely lacking, any alternative is seen a success.A Nonetheless, this holds true in the short run; in the long term — specifically over a century — there is a necessity for a meticulously devised system rather than a superficial solution.
 
Consequently, when examining advancements in Civil Defence, it is pertinent to inquire whether we can establish, in conjunction with the immediate measures prompted by Russia’s ongoing aggression and the associated threat of assault,2 a sustainable civil defense system that effectively safeguards the Estonian population, emulating the practices of our northern counterparts. While the russist ideology persists, a robust value system entrenched in society, there is no room for a diluted kind of civil defense in this region, as evidenced by the authentic experiences of both Finns and Ukrainians. We cannot delude ourselves into believing that a regime transition over the eastern border will result in a hoped-for rush to turn swords into plowshares as it has been hoped for countless times before. Ultimately, a millennium of history does not truly recall such an era and such a desire.
 
The awareness that we inhabit a volatile region is at least a millennium old, thus eastward aggression should not astonish anyone. Utilizing this knowledge in the establishment of short-term civil defense, we risk emulating Turkey, where the public sector “invented” a building amnestyB in 1984 that intentionally compromised the safety of its citizens, despite the acknowledged threat of earthquakes.3
 
Consequently, due to a rapid, inexpensive, yet myopic and poorly conceived strategy, the Turks swiftly acquired permits for any unlawfully constructed or modified edifices by paying a fee to the government, which notably lacked any building inspections.4 More than 55,000 people died as a result of that decision and the 2023 earthquake. An other example is that, at the onset of the coronavirus outbreak, despite years of alerts from the Estonian Health Board, we ourselves did not have an adequate primary stock of personal protective equipment.
 
Furthermore, in the lack of shelters, a network of hiding places was rapidly established as the most viable alternative (which should serve as the ultimate answer for accommodating 65% of the people); nevertheless, this cannot be sustained in the long term, as they fail to offer the protection afforded by real shelters.6,C
 
Nonetheless, first significant measures have been implemented in the long-term civil defense framework; for instance, the establishment of the previously stated siren network is a crucial long-term investment.7 The delayed draft law on civil crises and national defense,8 together with the proposed amendment to the Emergency Situations Act, which mandates that new dwelling constructions have shelters above a specified square meterage, are also significant.
 
This development is essential for the long term; however, its impact will gradually affect the broader population, as the housing stock is being renewed at a pace of 1% annually,9 and adequate shelter remains unattainable for the majority. The balance between long-term and short-term need would necessitate, for instance, the establishment of public shelters.
 
The future presents various threats

Civil defense requires both a short-term and a long-term strategy, substantial permanent resources, the resolve to take action, and, crucially, the capacity to anticipate scenarios where threats extend beyond Russia. The forthcoming decades are expected to present significant problems due to the heightened occurrence of extreme weather events resulting from the climate catastrophe, exemplified by the recent floods in Valencia,11-12 necessitating system preparedness. Preparing for various dangers and crises within a unified system necessitates not just inter-parliamentary collaboration but also a cross-ministerial commitment to develop integrated solutions that transcend isolated projects.

Otherwise, we will arrive at solutions that have “no analogues in the world”, where the ability to receive reinforcement in terms of troops and technics is counterbalanced by the inability to transport heavy equipment and provision them with fuel.13-14 This matter requires immediate attention.
Although significant progress has been achieved in disaster preparedness, there is a necessity for enhancement in collaborative risk assessment across many scenarios, as well as in the design and architecture of systems. The development of civil defense as a proactive system is essential now and in perpetuity, emulating the practices of Finland, Japan, and numerous other countries. This necessity arises from the persistent risks inherent to our geographical location and the likelihood of an increase in crises stemming from various factors.
 
Simultaneously, it should be acknowledged that in the equation of safeguarding the population during crises, our deficiency lies not in financial resources but in time, which cannot be borrowed or enlarged inside the economy. There is a pressing necessity for ongoing political collaboration, wherein legislators prioritize the imperative of civil defence above all other considerations. Only then would it be feasible to establish a strategic, concrete structure that will provide us with, for instance, public shelters or thoroughly planned civil defense training.
 
Until then, we remain in an environment where it is crucial to strike a balance between immediate solutions and long-term investments, with short election cycles typically favoring the former. In this context, citizens face the potential for a permanent alteration in vital expedited solutions, which must be avoided by keeping an eye on developments in the sector.
 
Remarks
A Nonetheless, the siren installations in 22 settlements1will constitute the initial and most limited tier of the essential nationwide network.
B As of 2018, almost 50% of buildings, totaling nearly 13 million, were noncompliant with building and safety regulations under a “legally permissible” scheme, as reported by the Turkish Ministry of Environment and Urbanizatio.4
C The Interior Ministry’s current plan stipulates the establishment of 730,000 shelters throughout the country by 2035, primarily through the conversion of basements.10
 
× The op-ed  was previously published on January 2 and January 4, 2025 on the Postimees web portal. Photo: civil defence needs a vision (Crisis Research Centre, 2025).
 
Sources
1 Luht-Kallas, K. 2024. Riiklik avalikkuse hoiatamise süsteem ja ohuteavitus Eestis. Siseministeerium, lk 36.
2 Tefft, J & Courtney, W. 2024. Russia’s Imperial Ambitions Are a Clear Threat to NATO. 01.11.2024, RAND.
5 Rudi, H. 2022.  Eesti kodud on nõukogudeaegsete paneelmajade nägu. 05.10.2022, ERR.
6 Bilginsoy, Z. & Fraser, S. 2023. Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake. 10.02.2023, Associated Press.
7 Luht-Kallas, K. 2024. Ohuteavituse süsteem peab olema võimalikult paindlik. 09.02.2024, ERR.
8 Riigikantselei. 2023. Tsiviilkriisi ja riigikaitse seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri. 11.06.2024, Eelnõude Infosüsteem.
9 Landeiro, I. & Jet, O. 2024. Varjendite rajamise nõue võib kergitada korterite hinda. 06.11.2024, ERR.

Jaga postitust:

info@kruk.ee

+37255503946

Copyright © 2024 Crisis Research Centre | Made with love by Kuukukk Disain

Get A Quote
Get A Quote